The effects of inter-government fiscal arrangements on variation in regional economic growth are ana lyzed for Russia, a country with large cross-regional differences and considerable fiscal redistribution. Moreover, fiscal reforms implemented in the first half of 2000s, which followed to some extent scientific advice, make analysis of this case particularly interesting. We observe that post-reform fiscal redistribution became more rational and this resulted in fewer incentive distortions. We found no negative association between federal transfers and regional growth. Furthermore, there are no major differences between donor and recipient regions in the way how inter-governmental fiscal arrangements influence regional growth. Overall, fiscal policy variables have become less important growth determinants than it was the case in the 1990s. Still further refo rms in federalism arrangements would be desirable.
Introduction
The purpose of the paper is to analyze incentive effects of the modern fiscal equalization system in Russia, which has emerged after the implementation of inter-governmental fiscal reforms in the early 2000s.
The possibility that fiscal equalization arrangements may have unforeseen detrimental incentive effects is broadly accepted by the theory of fiscal federalism. However, explicit empirical analysis of such incentive effects appears to be limited in its coverage. Still, a number of informative empirical country studies were undertaken to assess the impact of prevailing inter-government fiscal arrangements on various economic outcomes such as efficiency of subnational public expenditures (Balaguer-Coll et al. (2004) ), subnational tax (Smart and Bird (1997) ) and growth rates (Baretti et al. (2002) , (Thießen (2004) ), and development of subnational revenue bases (Jin et al. (2004) ).
Russia is an ideal country to study incentive effects of fiscal equalization because of its large size, major regional income and growth disparit ies, and high concentration of natural resource wealth. These factors are also the major reasons that justify the existence of a relatively large inter-governmental equalization system. For Russia, several explicit studies of incentive effects were done but they cover the period of the 1990s, i.e., before the new wave of Russian inter-governmental fiscal reforms in the early 2000s was introduced. They all agree that the pre-reform system had substantial deficiencies mainly because of its non-transparency, ad hoc decisions regarding transfers, unfunded expenditure mandates, and arbitrary distribution of revenues. These deficiencies contributed to short-term horizons of decision making by regional governments, poor efficiency of public goods provision, and economic growth losses (Zhuravskaya (2000) , Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003) , Popov (2004) , Desai et al. (2005) , Thießen (2006) , Freinkman and Plekhanov (2009) ). Of these contributions our following analysis is closest to that of Desai et al. (2005) in examining the effects of fiscal equalization on per-capita GDP growth, because we use the same main indicators of the equalization system, namely the tax retention rate each region faces and regional dependence on intergovernmental transfers from the federal center. The main differences with that study are two: we analyze the incentive effects under the post-reform arrangements and we employ extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to identify these effects.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the relevant Russian reforms. Section 3 explains our approach of using extreme bounds analysis to examine the incentive effects and presents the main results. Finally, section 4 concludes.
The reforms included a strengthening of the federal revenues at the expense of the initial retention in the regions of locally-raised tax revenue and thus were accompanied by an increase in transfers from t he federal center to regions 1 . But at the same time there was a clarification of the division of powers between levels of government both with regard to taxation and spending, which to a large degree followed scientific advice. For instance, tax sharing was substantially reduced. Revenues from taxes on natural resource wealth were given almost entirely to the federal government. Subnational governments were given exclusively the revenues from personal income taxes, several important excises, and from inheritance, property and small business taxes.
In 2008, federal government revenues equaled about 22% of GDP, while subnational government revenues attained about 15% of GDP before transfers (computed using the data on the execution of government budget borrowed from the database of the State Treasury of Russia http://www.roskazna.ru/reports/cb.html). Although these subnational government revenues are not sufficient for adequate financing of subnational expenditure responsibilities, there is now a responsibility of the federal government to finance all delegated expenditures via transfers, at least on paper. Hence, unfunded expenditure mandates were largely eliminated, while there is more transparency now regarding the allocation of expenditure responsibilities.
Also, Russia introduced other inter-governmental fiscal reforms in the beginning of the 2000s, notably the tax reforms with a reduction of the number of taxes and drastic cuts in tax rates, which made tax administration simpler, increased acceptance of the tax system, and promoted tax compliance (Gorodnichenko et al. (2008) ). This contributed to the upsurge of income tax revenues relative to GDP, which to a large extent accrue to subnational governments.
Reforms were also introduced regarding the inter-governmental transfer system: The most important instrument of fiscal equalization, the "Fund for Financial Support of the Regions" (FFSR) was reformed. This fund is supposed to reduce horizontal per-capita revenue differences and together with other formula-based funds administers about 70% of all federal financial assistance to regions. FFSR transfers are strictly based on formulae and most recently a three-year plan for transfer allocations was introduced. Also the second most important fund for financia l assistance to regions, the "Compensation Fund" (CF), which finances federally mandated expenditures, is based on formulae. The formulae are very advanced and complicated because they intend to consider many aspects of the "need" of regions 2 .
Although there are still essential weaknesses in Russia's intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, and the system is still subject to much criticism, the overall direction of these reforms was towards an improvement in transparency, accountability, impartiality, and thus possibly it brought about better incentives for subnational governments to improve the efficiency of public goods delivery. This provides the impetus for our analysis.
Econometric estimation

Extreme bounds analysis
There is a vast econometric l iterature exploring the impact of different economic, social, institutional, and political factors on economic growth. In many cases, the regressions include only small number of potential combinations of explanatory variables. Hence, they may ignore some important factors strongly correlated with growth. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to judge about the robustness of such results, since they may turn insignificant (fully or partially) under alternative specifications.
In order to check the robustness of parameter estimates for a variable of interest, the so-called extreme bounds analysis can be used. This approach was suggested by Leamer (1983) and basically implies trying all possible combinations of variables in order to obtain the distribution of the parameter estimates of interest under all alternative specifications. The extreme upper (lower) bound is defined as the maximum (minimum) of all thus obtained parameter estimates plus (minus) two standard errors. The parameter estimate is judged to be robust if both extreme bounds have the same sign. However, as Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) has claimed, this approach is too restrictive for any variable to pass the EBA test. The reason is that, if the distribution of parameter estimates has some positive and some negative support, then one inevitably finds at least one regression, for which the estimated coefficient changes the sign if enough regressions are run. Therefore, he suggests using as a test of robustness the cumulative density function estimated at zero, CDF(0). In fact, the larger of the areas under the density function above or below zero (i.e., regardless of whether this is CDF(0) or 1-CDF (0)) is denoted as CDF (0), which therefore varies between 0.5 and 1. According to this test, the estimated parameter is said to be robust, or significant, if CDF(0) > 0.95. This test is equivalent to checking whether the 90% interval (between 5 -th percentile and 95-th percentile) in the distribution of a parameter includes zero.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper applying EBA to the analysis of economic growth in Russian regions, namely - Ahrend (2008) . It examines a wide range of fa ctors that possibly affect growth, however, does not consider the effects of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements.
A typical regression equation for EBA is defined as:
where Y is the dependent variable; SV is the matrix of core "standard" explanatory variables, which are commonly included in the growth regressions; V I is the variable of interest; AV is the matrix of several (usually three) additional explanatory variables, and u is an error term.
As dependent variable the average annual growth rate of real Gross Regional Product (GRP) over the period 1998-2006 was taken.
There are two groups of fiscal variables of interest. The first group includes the retention rate (RR) of the regions, reflecting the share of locally collected taxes retained by the regional budgets. Three different measures of RR are used. First, RR has been computed based on total regional revenues, RRa; second, on the revenues from all the main taxes (such as profit tax, income tax, VAT, excises, various mineral resources taxes, and land tax), RRb; and, third, on the revenues from the main taxes excluding VAT and mineral resources taxes, RRc. The VAT and most resource taxes are the key source of federal revenues, which since 2001 have not been shared with subnational governments. Thus, the collection and sharing of the latter taxes has the least impact on incentives of regional governments.
Each measure of retention ratio is calculated as:
where RevenueT is the total revenue collected at the regional level before being distributed between the revenue going to the federal budget, RevenueF , and that remaining at the regional level, RevenueR.
The second group of fiscal variables is represented by the transfer ratios (TR), reflecting regional dependence on federal transfers. Again, as in the case of retention rate, there are three alternative measures of transfer ratio depending on the revenue base: TRa, TRb, and TRc. Each measure of transfer ratio is calculated as:
where TransferF2R is the total federal transfers to regions, which are not of reimbursable nature, i.e., excluding federal budget loans granted to the regions. The ratio is defined in the interval [0,+∞), since the transfers in some cases by far and large exceed 3 the revenues remaining at the regional level after all the federal revenues are transmitted to the federal budget.
On average in 1999-2006, Russian regions retained between 60% and 80% (depending on the definition of retention rate) of taxes they collected, and this rate has either remained unchanged (in case of RRa) or increased by about 10 percentage points (in case of RRb and RRc) over the period. As Table 1 shows, the variation (as measured by coefficient of variation, or CV) of both retention rates and transfer ratios across regions has decreased in the second subperiod, 2002-2006, compared to the first subperiod, 1999-2002 . This is mainly due to the fact that the minimum retention rates and transfer ratios have substantially increased. In case of transfer ratios, a reduction in the maximum values has also contributed to the decline in CV, too. The decline in variation of these fiscal variables suggest, in our view, that the system of regional fiscal redistribution in Russia has been evolving in the direction of the system of inter-governmental arrangements that is based on the universal legal and regulatory framework, with f ewer exemptions and special deals between the center and individual regions. It can be assumed that the effects of fiscal federalism can be different depending on whether the region is net donor or recipient of the federal budget resources. The donor/recipient regions can be distinguished based on the difference between the revenues going to the federal budget and the transfers returning to the regional level, RF -TF2R. Thus, if RF -TF2R > 0, the region is said to be a donor, otherwise it is denoted as a recipient. In other words, a donor (recipient) is a region that gives to the federal budget more (less) than what it obtains from the federal budget as a transfer 4 . Given that we consider three different measures of revenues, there are also three options for the donor/recipient dummy. When all the revenues are accounted for, one can identify 49 donor regions out of the total of 77 regions. When only main tax revenues and main tax revenues excluding natural resource taxes and VAT are considered, the number of donor regions is reduced to 45 and 21, respectively.
A modified version of the original equation (1), where the regions are split into donors and recipients, was estimated:
where Idonor/recipient is a dummy variable equal to one, when the region is donor, and zero, when the region is recipient.
In the seminal paper on cross-country growth regressions by Levine and Renelt (1992) , the matrix SV includes four variables: initial GDP per capita, investment share of GDP, as a proxy for physical capital, as well as the average annual population growth rate and the secondary school enrollment rate as proxies for human capital.
In his recent paper on the determinants of growth in Russian regions, Ahrend (2008) uses only two standard variables: initial GRP per capita and secondary school enrollment rate. He claims that the investment data for Russian regions are not reliable at all and drops the population variable without commenting.
In this paper, we have decided to replace the secondary school enrollment rate with the university enrollment rate (share of the university students in total regional population averaged over [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , because secondary education in Russia is compulsory. As a result, the former variable is not very informative and displays no noticeable variation -see Table  2 . By contrast, the university enrollment rate varies a lot and may serve as a better proxy for human capital differences across the regions 5 . In addition, the population growth variable is included in our SV -variables list, for, given very low natural population growth in Russia, its regional dynamics reflects the migratory flows of the qualified labor force. Many poor regions, especially those to the east of Ural mountains, are characterized by a substantial outflow of the labor force, which negatively affects their production potential, whereas richer regions in the European part of Russia benefit from the inflow of the qualified workers. Finally, as a third standard variable, we used the per-capita GRP in 1998 corrected for the purchasing power parity (PPP) factor of Granberg and Zaitseva (2002) that allows accounting for the existing large price level differences among Russian regions. To sum up, our set of SV -variables include three variables: real per-capita GRP in 1998, university enrollment rate, and annual average rate of population growth. Sources:
• Expert -Exp ert Rating Agency (http://www.raexpert.ru/ratings/regions/).
• Treasury -Russian Federal Treasury (http://www.roskazna.ru/reports/mb.html).
• Rosich -an independent expert Yury Rosich (http://www.geoteka.ru/text.html?page=usl).
• Rosstat -Federal State Statistics Office (http://www.gks.ru/wps/portal/russian).
• Socpol -Independent Institute for Social Policy (http://www.socpol.ru/about/index.shtml).
• World Bank -Russian Federation Poverty Assessment, June 28, 2004, World Bank (http://194.84.38 .65/mdb/upload/PAR_020805_eng.pdf).
• W&R-Weinberg and Rybnikova (http://data.cemi.rssi.ru/GRAF/center/projects/regions/9.htm). Note: CV stands for coefficient of variation.
Following the tradition of the EBA literature, the number of additional variables included in each regression was set to three. This number allows keeping the number of regressions with different combinations of explanatory variables manageable. Thus, given that the total pool of additional variables in our case contains 35 series, there would be 6,545 combinations with three AV-variables, 52,360 with four variables, 324,632 with five AV-variables, and so on.
All the variables used in these estimations are listed in Table 2 . The table reports the sources of data as well as some descriptive statistics, such as minimum, mean, maximum, and coefficient of variation.
Econometric results
Before we turn to the estimation results, let us examine simple linear correlations between the variables of interest, which are reported in Table 3 . The correlations between retention rates and per-capita GRP levels are declining almost continuously during the whole sample period and turn from positive to negative around [2002] [2003] , that is, in the years immediately after Russia's inter-governmental finance reforms were implemented. Thus, tax sharing arrangements became progressive after 2002, since the richer regions tend to have lower retention rates and pay more taxes to the common federal pool of revenues. This may be considered to be a positive effect of the inter-governmental fiscal reforms. These correlations in Table 3 may even underestimate the degree of negative association between the retention rate and per-capita GRP due to the presence of several outliers, notably Tiumen region and Moscow city, as shown in Figure 1 displaying RRb versus GRP per capita. The correlations between per-capita transfers and per-capita GRP levels are also declining over time, although they were always negative. It implies that the transfers are increasingly transmitted to the regions that are relatively poor and have a greater need in federal support.
The correlation between retention rates and the annual growth rate of real GRP is rather low and shows no clear trend, although in the last 2-3 years it has been negative. Negative correlation between retention and growth can imply two things. Either higher retention is associated with lower growth, which may mean tha t leaving to the regions more resources discourages regional governments from stimulating the regional economy, or that richer regions, which have a lower retention rate, grow faster than the poor regions. The latter explanation is not very convincing. It is true that no significant convergence between Russian regions has been observed in 1998-2006, but there was no divergence either, since both rich and poor regions grew on average at the same rate during the period, as shown in Kholodilin et al. (2009) .
With respect to the first potential explanation, our sense is that there is no casualty link here, i.e., higher retention rates do not undermine regional incentives for growth. It is more likely that some regions are obtaining higher retention rates as a compensation for their peculiar local disadvantages (such as remoteness and other geographic constraints) that dampen their longer term growth perspectives. However, more analysis of this interaction may be needed in the future.
The rest of this section discusses our core regression results. Our investigation was undertaken in stages. First, regressions were estimated using the OLS method for the whole period, 1999-2006, without splitting the sample into donor and recipient regions. The estimation results of the models corresponding to equation (1) are reported in Table 4 . The first four columns contain the measures introduced in Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) , while the last three columns are those due to Leamer (1983) . From Table 4 it can be seen that, according to Leamer's EBA test, all Tables 5 and 6 . It can be seen from these tables that, although all transfer variables remain fragile in both sub-periods, at least the two first retention variables are robust across both sub-periods. In addition, the median coefficient estimates of RR variables are far larger before reform than after it was launched. Thus, the reform of the fiscal equalization system put in action in 2001 seems to weaken the link between the retention rate and regional economic growth.
Third, further insights can be gained by splitting regions into two groups: donors and recipients. Tables 7 and 8 contain the estimation results obtained by estimating equation (4) for two sub-periods. In 1999-2001, the effect of the retention rate on growth for both donors and recipients was robust. Moreover, they have a similar value for median coefficient estimates. This implies that the impact of the retention rate upon regional growth is similar across both groups of regions. In 2002-2006, only RRb remains robust, again the median coefficient estimates for donors and recipients are very close. All the transfer ratios in the first sub-period appear to be fragile for both groups of regions. However, in the second sub-period, the impact of transfer ratios of the donor regions prove to be robust and positive, whereas transfer ratios of recipients are still fragile. It can be concluded that after the reform larger transfers to the donor regions started to be positively associated with a stronger growth performance. (0) is the unweighted area under the distribution density function to the right of zero, when most part of distribution is positive, or to the left of zero (in fact, it is 1-CDF(0)), when most part of distribution is negative.
• Lower 5% (upper 95%) is the lower 5th percentile (upper 95th percentile) of distribution.
• Lower (upper) EB stands for the lower (upper) extreme bound.
• Share of parameters significant at 5% level is the proportion of regressions where the parameter estimates are significant at 5% level. • CDF(0) is the unweighted area under the distribution density function to the right of zero, when most part of distribution is positive, or to the left of zero (in fact, it is 1-CDF(0)), when most part of distribution is negative.
• Share of parameters significant at 5% level is the proportion of regressions where the parameter estimates are significant at 5% level.
Nevertheless, given that transfers are conditioned upon the economic situation in each region, it may well be the case that they are endogenous. Therefore, an additional check is needed to corroborate the robustness of our results obtained for the transfer variables. To do this we reconducted, at the fourth stage of our analysis, the EBA for transfer variables using the twostage least squares (2SLS) estimator. As instruments the lagged values of the transfer ratios were used. For the first subperiod these are the transfer ratios in 1998, while for the second sub-period -transfer ratios in 2001. The corresponding results are reported in Tables  9 and 10 . In addition to the standard EBA statistics, these tables contain also p-values of the Hausman, Sargan, and J-test as well as a test statistic for the Staiger-Stock's rule of thumb that allow testing the appropriateness of the selected instruments. If the null hypothesis of Hausman test is rejected, then the corresponding instrumented variable is endogenous. In all the estimated models, the Hausman test is exceeding 0.10 and hence the null hypothesis of endogeneity of the instrumental variable cannot be accepted. The null hypothesis of Sargan (J-)test is that all moment conditions are valid. If the test is rejected, it cannot be determined, which are the invalid moment conditions. In all models, both Sargan test and J-test lead to an acceptance of the validity of instruments. Finally, if Weak (F-statistic of all instruments' coefficients equal zero estimated at the 1st stage) is lower than 10.27, then instruments are considered as weak, i.e., not correlated with instrumented variable. In all the models we examined, F-statistic is by far and large exceeding the rule-of-thumb critical value of 10.27 and therefore our instruments can be considered as strong. According to these specification tests, the 2SLS models appear to be correctly specified. The results of the 2SLS estimation confirm those obtained using OLS. • CDF(0) is the unweighted area under the distribution density function to the right of zero, when most part of distribution is positive, or to the left of zero (in fact, it is 1-CDF(0)), when most part of distribution is negative.
• Share of parameters significant at 5% level is the proportion of regressions where the parameter estimates are significant at 5% level. (0) is the unweighted area under the distribution density function to the right of zero, when most part of distribution is positive, or to the left of zero (in fact, it is 1-CDF(0)), when most part of distribution is negative.
• Share of parameters significant at 5% level is the proportion of regressions where the parameter estimates are significant at 5% level. 
Notes:
• CDF(0) is the unweighted area under the distribution density function to the right of zero, when most part of distribution is positive, or to the left of zero (in fact, it is 1-CDF(0)), when most part of distribution is negative.
• Lagged values of transfer ratio are used as instruments. Notes:
• Lagged values of transfer ratio are used as instruments.
The overall important finding here is the lack of negative association between transfers and regional growth. This is in contrast to the situation in the 1990s, when, as reported by Desai et al. (2005) , regional transfer dependence was a significant determinant of slower growth.
The robust negative effect of variation in retention on regional growth patterns suggests that the inter-governmental finance reforms have been mostly growth encouraging: regions with a higher retention rate showed on average slower growth. This is in a contrast with the results by Desai et al. (2005) obtained for the second half of 1990s, when the retention rate was a positive determinant of regional growth in Russia. This change, in our view, points to a positive shift in inter-governmental fiscal arrangements. We interpret it as a sign that fiscal equalization became much more growth-neutral because higher taxation (lower retention) is not associated any longer with slower growth, and thus, it may suggest that federal government decisions on tax sharing would not affect much decisions of regional governments regarding their development strategy. As a result, regional growth is likely to depend largely on regional fundamentals (labor and resource endowments, geography 5 ), and less on short-term fiscal policy variables related to the politics of inter-governmental fiscal arrange ments. As mentioned above, the fact that the regions with higher retention have slower growth is, in our view, not directly related to inter-governmental fiscal arrangements.
Overall, the results for both the retention and transfer variables seem to sugge st that the federal inter-governmental fiscal policy became much more neutral with respect to regional government incentives to support growth. This is an important positive development.
Conclusion
Reforms of inter-government fiscal arrangements introduced in Russia in 2001-2002 have resulted in significant changes and general improvements in incentives for the regional governments. Prior to the reforms, the relationship between the retention rate and regional economic growth was positive, indicating that a higher contribution by regions to the federal budget (lower retention rate) was associated with lower growth. Regional taxation hampered the growth incentives. After the reforms, the relationship turned negative, implying that a higher regional tax burden does not result in a growth loss.
The correlation between regional per-capita income and the retention rate became negative too. This means that fiscal equalization became more progressive: wealthier regions have been contributing more. Thus, the Russian case is currently in strong contrast to the German one, where very low retention rates appear to discourage regional governments from promoting regional growth -see Baretti et al. (2002) . On the other hand, it is similar to the case of Ukraine where, as in Russia, both retention rates and the size of transfers relative to GDP are quite modest and the relationship between the retention rate and regional growth is negative -see Thießen (2004) .
We find that inter-governmental fiscal arrangements in Russia became more rational and this resulted in fewer incentive distortions. In particular, we find no negative association between federal transfers and regional growth. And there are no major differences between donor and recipient regions in the way how inter-governmental fiscal arrangements influence regional growth. Still additional reforms in fiscal equalization would be desirable. As shown by Figure  2 , there is still considerable room for improving the effectiveness of fiscal equalization. There are two problem groups of regions: 1) Those who had higher than average revenues per capita before fiscal equalization and whose position after equalization improved even further (e.g., Magadan and Kamchatka). 2) Those who had lower than average revenues before fiscal equalization and whose position after equalization further deteriorated (e.g., Cheliabinsk).
"Effectiveness of fiscal equalization, average over 1998-2006" The overall quality of fiscal equalization, as measured by the share of regions that aft er fiscal equalization moved towards the line of neutrality of fiscal equalization (it is equal to 100% minus the share of the two aforementioned groups of regions), improved only very slightly over the period of our analysis. In 1998-2000, it was 68.8%, while in 2004-2006 it increased to 70. 1 (although in 2001-2003 it fell down to 66.2%). Extending the formula-based approach to a larger share of total transfers could possibly allow overcoming these anomalies and achieving substantial improvements in the quality of fiscal equalization without having to raise the overall size of transfers.
Finally, we need to note a potentially important qualification of our analysis: in the early 2000s regional governors became much more dependent upon Russia's president. This reform was the introduction of the right for the president to dissolve regional parliaments should they elect a governor not accepted by the president. This of course is a substantial detachment of governors from their regional electorate. But the theory of fiscal federalism is built on the assumption that the regional governments are accountable to their electorate and follow in principle their will. Hence, this setting may influence the incentive structure of regional governments. Since we do not know the strength of this influence we need to emphasize this institutional anomaly as a potential qualification.
